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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
CLARENCE M. BECK,
Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

8011
DUTCHMAN COALITION MINES CO.,

Respondent and Cross-A.pp·ellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
AND CR,OSS-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
The general statement of the Appellant on page 1
of his ·brief does not mention the fact that the Defendant
filed a cross-appe·al (R. 50).
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The brief of appellant emphasizes the testin1ony
of the Plaintiff Beck and attempts to abstract it rather
completely. It is natural that the Appellant should
minin1ize the testimony in behalf of the Respondent:
but it seems necessary to an1plify the statement of the
facts somevvhat, by referring to the cross-examination
of the Appellant's witnesses and the testi1nony of RPspondent 's \Yitnesses a little niore completely.
It must be borne in 1nind that the v~rdict of thr
jury gave to the Appellant $1,500 by 111eans of ans,ver8
to special interrogatories and that th~ Appellant seek~
to overturn this verdict. The test of this must be 'vhether
any substantial evidence supports the verdict of the
jury-and this evidence is to be found on behalf of the
Respondent and not primarily in the direct te~ti1nony
of the Appellant and his \vitnesses.
Mr. Benjarnin L. Rich testified generally as abstracted on page 20 of Appellant's brief on direct examination. The brief then says: ''On cross-exa1nination,
Mr. Rich gave his opinion as to the value of the various
· parts of the services rendered by the Plaintiff.''
Mr. Rich and Mr. Van Dam were called after they
had heard only the testimony of Mr. Beck on direet
examination, the Court pointing out the limitation on
the value of their testimony at that point, \\Tithout the
benefit of cross-examination (R. 231). It was necessar)·
for. Mr. Rich to assume the facts as testified to by l\1 r.
Beck (R. 232). Mr. Rich testified that he \\'onld charge
$2,000 for the services rendered by Mr. Beck in 1951
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dissuading nir. Gottron from bringing an action, based
upon his understanding that Gottron otherwise would
·have filed the suit and that Beck pursuaded him not to
(R. 233). He also testified, as to the- laches of Mr. Beck
in bringing his action: "'Except if it had been my matter, my case, I '\vould have collected as I went along,
but that '\Vas not done * * * . Because I do not think it
vvould be good practice to let an account of this character, for attorney -fees, run for 30 years," (R. 234).
He also testifed that in his opinion money became due
J1r. Beck for each item of service performed, unless the
talk about Mr. Beck being paid ''when the company is
in a position to declare a dividend" altered that, and
as to this, it was his opinion that if the company had
money to pay the salary of Mr. Holden, then Mr. Beck
was equally entitled to his money at that time and
''Mr. Beck should have been paid as he -vvent along.''
(R. 235). .l\fr. Rich regarded as delicate the representation by Mr. Beck, if it should be established, of Dutchman Mines Coalition Company, and also the sub-lessees
(R. 238-239).
- Mr. Rich would have charged from $1,000 to $1,500
for handling of the Golden West Ejectn1ent suit and
from $500 to $750 for preparing Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, and original minutes (R. 240), and he
would have charged $5,000 or $6,000 for legal work on
patenting the four ·claims (R. 242).
l\fr. Rich testified that the parties by agreement
could effectively establish a lesser value for any of these
serviees, that different la,vyers have different ra.tes of
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charges, and that settlement of services on a particular
item on an agreed basis might be assumed to establish
the rate of compensation for future services (R. 242243).
1\tfr. Van Dam testified on cross-examination that
the companies he represen~ed had very substantial reYenues as compared to the record of the Dutchman Conlpany and that the rate of pay for legal services is altered
so1newhat by the ability of the client to pay (R. 2-1-7).
1\tfr. Van Dan1 refused to express any opinion as to the
value of the particular portions of the services rendered
by Mr. Beck (R. 249).
In connection \vith the abstract of Mr. Beck's testin1ony, \Ve have examined the correspondence and point
out that the correspondence does not support 1\fr. Beck's
state1nents about the work done each year. F'or in~ tanre,
at page 14, the brief states that Mr. Beck had extensiYe
negotiations 'vi th Mr. Cleghorn concerning the use of
equip1nent at the mine. The letters in Exhibit RR 1nake
no mention of such a fact. It cannot be assmued that
the correspondence contained in these numerous exhibits
supports the testimony of Mr. Beck and the ('OrreBponrlence itself has not been abstracted in Appellant's brief.
On cross-examination, in addition to and in amplification of, the abstract contained at page 21-2:) of .\ pp(~l
lant's Brief, Mr. Beck testified that his serviet~~ prior
to incorporation of the Respondent's corporation Wt\rP
not included in the action, although Mr. BP('k would
expect the aetion to in(·lude servi('es in a forP<'losun·
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action prior to the incorp,oration (R. 250). Mr. Beck
testified that he had no .written agreement covering
compensation for his legal services (R. 256) and that he
had asked for money for surveys but had n1ade no demand
prior to 1946 for payn1ent of his services in full and
knew of no instance \\There he had aske·d for any specific
item of expense \vhich had not been paid (R. 256.).
In a letter of July 9, 1944, which is Exhibit l, Mr.
Holden advised Mr. Beck that the valuation on the capital stock should be $100,000 allowing a profit of $8,000
for the year Hand I an1 not optimistic enough to hope
for more than that" (R. 267) and Mr. Holden rep·orted
to ~fr. Beck on October 30, 19·46, that royalties reeeived
since "last J tme" totaled $6,776.17 (R. 267).
On 11:arch 13, 1947, Beck advised Mr. I-Iolden that
the mine should gross $2,000 a day for the next 90 days
and a letter of April 28, 1947, from Mr. Beck to Mr.
Holden states that 52 tons of ore were produced in one
day and that frorn then to July would be a race to get all
the ore possible out of the mine (R. 268).
Another letter fro1n ~1r. Beck to Mr. Holden dated
December 16, 1944, referre·d in detail to the net smelter.
returns received (R. 269).
A letter (Exhibit FF) by Mr. Beck to Mr. Holden
dated June 14, 1926, states that he had sp·ent considerable
tilne working on the patents "but I am not charging for
this time as this matter has been extremely unfortunate"
but when asked whether he was now seeking to charge
for those se-rvi·ces in this· action, Mr. Beck replied,
"absolutely" (R. 276-277).
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In reference to the Golden \V. est ejectment suit, ~Ir.
B'eck also referred to his letter of June 19, 194-±, in 'vhich
he said "I acknowledge your check in full payment of
compensation" and he then testified that he was making
a clai1n for those services in this action, since "I \\·as
not charging for tin1e in that ease, I don't think I even
charged for the pleadings" (R.. 283) and then testified
that he had nothing in writing to contradict the staten1ent in his letter that the check was payment in full for
the Golden WeRt action.
vVith reference to the 20,000 shares of stock transferred to Mr. Beck in 1937, he testified that he received
certificate Nos. 72 and 73 for 10,000 shares each shortly
after October 25, 1937 (R.. 285) and that he paid no
cash for the stock and paid nothing for it ''unless just
work" and had never tendered the stock back to the
company as having been improperly issued (R. 285286). He assumed that the stock was to be offset against
what the company owed him (R. 288-289).
The minutes at page 38 and 42 of Exhibit B were
read to Mr. Beck (R. 285) and Mr. Beck admitted that
the minute book was brought to him in 1938, and was
exhibited to him, but testified he knew nothing about thP
minutes concerning the stock until the Inatter \\·as discussed at pre-trial of this case- (R. 293).
Beck admitted that Mr. Heist 'vas hired and paid
by Mr. Bourne in 1939 and 19·40 (R. 295-296).
Mr. Beck related a conservation with Mr. Holden
in the fall of 1946 or 1947, as follows:
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~'Q.

Did it take place in your office~
A. I remember why I said what I did~ very
distinctly.
Q. \V.ill you relate the conservation as you
recall it~
. A.. Yes, but I want an opportunity later to
explain it. Yes, I will relate it. Harry came to
me and he said that, 'We are going along pretty
good, and we "\vant to get all of the bills paid, and
"\Ve want to get ready to declare a dividend' and he
said, 'We want to get settled up with you,
finally.' "
"'Then for the first time in the whole 30 years
he put this in, 'I lmow, Clarence, you are going to
be reasonable. I know you will he reasonable. You
won't charge too much,' and that is where the
first suspicion came up. I immediately started! will confess-! immediately started to wonder,
and as I remember, this was close to the tax year,
and I did say I would rather we would settle up
next year. But I \Vas very shocked about this
'n1odest and reasonable fee'" (R. 299-300)."
By reference to Exhibits 5 and 6 this conversation
was fixed as occuring in 1946 (R. 300). Exhibit 5 was
dated August 6, 1947, was produced from the files of
Mr. Beck and was a letter addressed to him by Mr.
Holden. Mr. Holden reminded Mr. Beck of the request
for a bill and insisted that it be sent saying: "It may be
best to delay any further legal expense until this matter
is cleared up" and again requested Beck's state~ent "as
when I tried to get it from you last year, you put it off
on account of your taxes" (R. 302-303).
~f r. Beck testified that the expenses on his trips to
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Chicago subsequent to 1947, were ·paid by a Los Angele~
syndicate of which Mr. Holden was not a part (R. 306).
Mr. Beck acknowledged sending Exhibit ll to J1r.
I-Iolden on February 10, 1945, in which he discussed
negotiations with Combined 1\Ietals Company and said.
"I did not kno'v until I had spent a lot of time on the
deal that it was another deal, until you informed 1ne,
beeause I only had authority to deal in behalf of the
majority stockholders of the leasing company, and this.
of course, is the only way the Dutchman Co1npany can
wiggle out no,v," (R. 321) and testified that in the event
of success in that deal he vv-ouldn't have to look to Booth
and Gardner for payn1ent, but if they had given hin1
something he vvouldn't have turned it down (R. 223) and
that he never advised Mr. Holden that he intended to hold
the Dutchrnan Company for his time and services in
that matter (R. 324).
Mr. Beck testified that the largest file in his office
.is the file of Willard Cleghorn and that on May 24,
1947, he advised Nlr. Holden by letter that Co1nbined
Metals R.eduction Company had offered him an extraordinarily good deal (R. 326). This transaction was
beneficial to both Mr. Cleghorn and the Dutchman Company and Mr. Beck testified that this service was substantial to both, that he did not charge Mr. Cleghorn
for the services and did not advise Mr. Holden that he
was looking to the Dutchman Company for pay1nent
(R. 326-327). He gave the san1e testimon~T r.oncerning
negotiations with the Rio (}rande Railway in a lettrr in
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April, 1947, to 1lr. Holden (R. 327 -328). Mr. Beck testified to some services connected with an RF·C Loan
obtained by the Lessees of the Dutchman Mine and that
he was attempting to hold the Dutchman Company for
those services but had never advised Mr. Holden of his
intentions as to eon1pensation (R. 329-330).
On recross-examination Mr. Beck admitted writing
on March 13, 1943, that he was enclosing the bill requested
by ~Ir. Holden and that "the fee for preparation of
pleadings, etc., can \vait" and that on June 12, 19·44, he
wrote ··I enclose a bill for payment in full of services on
the Dutchman lawsuit" and after receiving the check,
he wrote, "I acknowledge your check in full p·ayment of
the compensation for services in the Golden West ejectment la,vsuit" and that he had never notified. Mr. Holden
that this was anything other than pay1nent in full for
that matter (R. 335).
In addition to the n1atters abstracted hy the Appellant at pages 24-25 of the Ap~pellant's brief Mr. Willard
Cleghorn testified as follows: Mr. Beck was never taken
into the mine by him and never went into the mine as
far as he knows, but was told that once he went to the
collar of the shaft in the main tunnel ( R. 345). After
several failures of Mr. Beck to make changes in a proposed lease as requested by him, he broke off negotiations and the next year Mr. Holden agreed to the changes
and he (Cleghorn) employed Frank Johnson to draw up
the contract and that was the contract which was executed with the Lessees and the Dutchman Company (R.

•
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348-349). l-Ie never discussed with ~Ir. Beck the operations of the mines under his direction, or the amount of
royalties being paid, except in a general way and Mr.
Beck was advised that ore was being shipped (R. 351).
During the fall of 1945, Cleghorn did much actual physical work at the mine, and afterwards spent most of his
tin1e 'vith the ad1ninistrative responsibilities but 'vas at
the Inine ·probably 80% of the time. Beck called at his
hon1e 8 or 10 tilnes, and they discussed the condition of
the mine and \vhether ore was being mined (R.. 354). He
knows of no complaint at anytime about the way the
1nine was being operated by him (R. 356).

In addition to the matters abstracted in Appellant's
brief at pages 25-26, Mr. Alma Bourne testified as follows: Mr. Bourne hired Mr. Heist and paid him for
his services in 1938, 39, 40 (R. 360). The RFC Loan for
the Lessees was negotiated by him, with the assistance
of Harvey IIeist and }fr. Beck did absolutely nothing
on the Golden Westloan (R. 372).
In addition to the testimony abstracted in Appellant's
brief from pages 26-30, Mr. H. W. Holden testified as
follows: In June 1924, he asked 1\Ir. Beck what it "~ould
cost to complete patents on four claims and was told
he could do it for $600 and the n1oney was paid itntnediately. An item of $30 paid to Mr. Beck at about the
same time, he could not identify (R. 388). 1-le learned
later that Senior and Senior were doing the patents
'(R. 388). Following the 1937 meetings when the 20,000
shares of stock were transferred to l\1 r. Beck the minutP
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book \Vith these I~nutes in it were given to Mr. Beck
\Yho read them and said nothing about the matter (R.
396). l\fr. Beck at no tin1e had advised Mr. Holden the
basis upon \Yhich he ,,~as to be paid for various aspects
of legal work and has never advised him that he expected
to be paid for other services on a basis different from
that on services for which payment was made ( R. 398).
~Ir. Holden at no time p:aid a salary to himself when
there v;ere outstanding bills against the company and if
:J1r. Beck had rendered a statement at any time his bill
would have been paid before the salary (R. 400).
Follovving the conservation in the fall of 1947, no
authority was given to Mr. Beck to act for the Dutchnlan Con1pany in connection with Mr. Gottron (R. 409).
Exhibit B, in the minute for February 10, 1941,
refers to an item of $65.10 for office expenses, the
minutes being signed by Mr. Holden and Mr. Beck. He
does not remember whether that office expense was his
or not (R. 440-441).
A letter from Mr. Holden to Mr. Gottron dated July
31, 1946 "(Exhibit XX) states "I would welcome any court
action that you might wish to start, for to me you are
only another small stockholder and you will receive the
same consideration as the rest of the stockholders" (R.
460).
On August 4, 1948, Mr. Gottron concluded a letter
with "was pleased with the information. contained in
your letter and hope when you go to the mine you will
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have good news. Sincerely yours, J. F. Gottron" (Exhibit
18, R. 462).
A letter in the same Exhibit dated March 2, 1949,.
concludes with "Hope you are enjoying good health and
a pleasant winter. \Tery truly yours, J. F. Gottron" (R.
463) and on March 18, 1949, a letter from the same exhibit
is an invitation to meet Mr. Holden in Utah, '~and go to
the rnine with hjm" (R. 463). On July 11, 1949, a letter
in the same exhibit refers to a meeting with Mr. Book
in which Beck had told him of the check for $1,000 sent
by l\1r. I-Iolden and that Beck expected to ask for $5,500
and says: "Have no idea whether :rvfr. Beck has rendered
a bill but at least the amount mentioned was an indication of \vhat will be asked and certainly could be no more"
and concludes with: "Hope this finds you in good health
and that the hot weather we have had has not bothered
you on the West coast" (R. 463).
On November 10, 1950, in a letter from the same
Exhibit, l\fr. Gottron 'vrote that Clarence Beck had been
in Chicago for several weeks, but he had been unable
to see him.
Mrs. Holden's testimony was not referred to in
Appellant's brief. In her short testimony was included
a recital of the conversation in the Hotel Utah Coffee
Shop in October or early November of 1947, when l\1r.
Holden said to Mr. Beck: "Mr. Beck you got my letter,
we want nothing more to do with you and your office in
regard to the Dutchman. You know that is what I told
you in the letter. I have nothing to go to your office for"
(R. 469-470).
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Exhibit 20 also received 1n evidence, consisted of
documents produced by the Plaintiff frorn his files in
response to a demand and containing correspondence
with Mr. Gottron (R. 472). Excerpts from some of these
letters are as follo,vs :
Beck to Gottron, February 10, 1948: ' Dear Gottron:
*** The annual financial statement of course is out. I
have not seen it. I guess I am in the dog house, but will
try to get a copy. You of course as a stockholder are
entitled to it. It will have in detail all of the information
you spoke of" ( R. 4 72) .
4

Gottron to Beck,· January 20, 1949 : "Dear Clarence·
*** Just wondered if you knew anything that might be
of interest regarding the Dutchman. Heard indireetly
from Bill Childs that you were no longer acting as
attorney for the company and would enjoy hearing from
you at your convenience" (R. 473).
Beck to Gottron, February 1, .1949: . "Is there any
evidence that I am to bring suit~ Is this a passing fancy,
or a fancy pass from the company~ I seem to be groping
in a factual vacuum. If I am to bring suit I want to get
busy, but it occurs to me that this would be perhaps the
last thing the management vvould want, and for very
obvious reasons" (R. 473).
Gottron to Beck, F·ebruary 10, 1949: "As I told you,
I have a complete file and much of it, I believe, will be
of interest to you" (R. 473).
Gottron to Beck, March 18, 1949 : "Believe the inforlnation I have at Chicago would be of benefit and our
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getting together might prove valuable to both of us'' (R..
474).
Beck to Gottron, April 23, 1949: "Dear Jack, It was
my intention to see you on n1y return last trip, but connections simply would not permit. I have planned to be
· in Chicago all of Wednesday of next week, that is to say,
April 27th. A substantial part of the day I 'viii be in
the elear with nothing to do, and will telephone you at
first opportunity" (R. 475).
Gottron to Beck, September 22, 1949 : "Would be
glad to hear fro1n you, as shortly, I propose to do something that may change Holden's attitude. I 'vanted to
come to Salt Lake before going into the matter but no'v
have decided to employ legal talent in Los Angeles, and
some auditors, and then determine how the Dutch1nan
was set up originally, how Holden can issue stock without notifying the stockholders and many other things
that might embarrass him" (R. 475).
Gottron to Beek, Oetober 5, 1949 : "Dear Clarence:
Received a copy of your letter written Mr. Holden, and
while I am not familiar with all you have done for the
Dutchman, it seems to me the bill for thirty year's service is reasonable. There is so1nething about the Inanagement of the Dutchman :by Holden that deserves investigation, and I hope if Holden does not treat you as he
should, that you will join forces with me in trying to
see that the stockholders are given the consideration they
are entitled to because of 1noney invested. • • • Would
like your advice as to how to go about this, as, as soon
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as I haYe the information, expect to start action against
Holden" (R. -!75-476).
Beck to Gottron, ~larch 2-l:, 1952: '"Dear Jack: The
last times I \Yas through Chicago I 'vas unable to reach
yon over the telephone *** I have decided to file my suit
today, and of course, this will undoubtedly require a
great amount of accounting on Harry's part. I should
like to get your view in the premises. I have nothing
East requiring any time in the near future, except at
Cleveland, and it is doubtful that I will stop at Chicago''"
(R. 478).
Gottro nto Beck, l\Iarch 31, 1952: "Dear Clarence:
Thanks for your letter of the 24th and I am glad to
kno'v you are going to start action as Holden has had
everything his way for too long a time and I hope you
give him the trimming of his life."
'"At present an old friend of mine introduced me· to
an attorney who recovered quite a sizable amount for a
deal ahnost like Holden and the Dutchn1an, he has examined my papers and is willing to take Holden into Court,
if I \vill give him a 25% interest in 1ny holdings in the
mine. Before doing so I 'vould like your ideas as I have
never been involved in a court action in my life and had
hoped I never would be, but this Holden attitude has
almost got me and I think he should get what he
deserves."
"Let me know what you have done and if you will
tell me how you think I should act under the circumstaners it would he appreciated. Hope this finds you well

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
and that 've may get together before too long" (R. 478479).
Mr. Beck was called as a rebuttal witness and 'vas
asked this question, "The conversations you had 'vith
Mr. Gottron 'vere 'vi th the idea of getting this diffieul ty
adjusted between l\fr. I-Iolden and 1\tlr. Gottron ?" (R.
482), and answered in part as follows : "He would say
to me, 'When are we going to get this guy Holden out of
this,' and he would say, 'vVhen are you going to do son1ething~', and then he said he 'vas playing both ends
against the middle, ***" (R. 483), and when asked about
the mutual or combined interests referred to in son1e of
the Gottron letters, Beck answered, "Gottron wanted to
be on the Board of Directors and he wanted a dividend.
He thought that was n1utual to me. Holden was my boss
and I was trying to serve him and had given Holden the
best I had in me, my whole life" (R. 488).
After both parties had rested counsel met 'vi th the
Court in Chambers, which does not appear in the reeord
but is indicated by the staten1ent at R. 491 that the jury
was excused and by the stipulation there referred to,
'vhich indicates that there had been a discussion by the
Court and counsel and the Court said "Is that a correct
statement of your agreement, gentlemen~" ( R. 491 ) .
The special verdict as given and returned by the
jury was as follows:

GROUP NO. 1:
(a)

What is the reasonable value of all of
the non gratuitous services, legal and
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otherwise, eompleted by the Plaintiff for
the defendant, and at the request of the
defendant, or in such 1nanner as to be
reasonable within the request of the
defendant, or of such nature as to benefit the defendant, or services recognized
or aeknowledged or ratified by the defendant, for which the Plaintiff has not
been paid in each of the following periods:
After July 31, 1921, and before November 1, 1947__________ $1,100.00
After October 31, 1947 and
before March 25, 1948____________
300.00
After March 24, 1948 and
before March 25, 1952____________
100.00
Total -------------------------------- $1,500.00
Your total cannot exceed $10,000.00.
, Place a cross on the line at the end of each
proposition hereinafter submitted to you that you
adopt as your verdict and find to be true under
the instructions submitted herewith:

GROUP NO. 2:
(a)

The last work that the plaintiff Mr.
Beck did, non-gratuitiously, for the defendant company, that was reasonably
within the request of the defendant .company, or Mr. Holden, was finished before
March 25, 1948.
No
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(b)

The last work that the plaintiff, Jir.
Beck, did non-gratutiously, for the de.:.
fendant company that was reasonably
within the. request of the defendant company, or Mr. I-Iolden, was finished later
than 1\iarch 24, 1948.

X

GROUP NO.3:
(

a)

The plaintiff and the defendant intended
that the individual items of account between then1 for services rendered by nir.
Beck should not be considered independently, but should be considered as a continuatio:q of a related series, and that
the a:ccoun t should be subject to a shifting balance as additional, related services were to be rendered, and as payments were to be made thereon.

(b)

The plaintiff and defendant intended
that the individual items of the account
between them for services rendered hy
Mr. Beck, should be considered independently and not as a continuation of
a related series, and that the defendant
would owe the plaintiff for each iten1 of
service performed, and not for a balance on all of the said services together.
X
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GROUP NO.4:
(a)

The defendant company terminated the
service of the plaintiff in 1947.

('b)

The defendant company did not terminate the services of the plaintiff in 1947.

X
GROUP NO. 5:
( 1)

By a preponderance of the evidence was
there an agreement that was never
modified to the effect that the p~laintiff
-vvould rendered general services for the
defendant corporation for which he
would be paid upon the happening of a
contingency or a particular event~
Yes

If you have answered "No" to the above, question, do not answer the balance of the questions in
this group. If you have answe-red "yes" to the
above question, then answer the following question:
( 2)

By a preponderance of the evidence
state by -vvhat date, if any, the contingency or p·articular event had occured.
Se·pt. 11, 1947
(State a date or year, or
write "None proven.")
Exhibit #6
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If you have not stated a date on the foregoing
question do not ans\ver the remaining question in
this group. If you have stated a date, then ans\ver
the following question:
( 3)

By a preponderance of the evidence by
what date, if any, did the plaintiff kno"·
or should he have known, that the contingency or event had occured ~
Sept. 11, 1947
(State a date or year, or
write "None proven.")
/s/ LaMar E. Peterson

F·OR.E~1AN

(R. 19-21)

And the supplemental special verdict as given and
returned was ;

GROUP NO. 6:
(1)

When you decided in Group No. 1 that
$1500 had been earned by the plaintiff
and was unpaid, was the $1000 represented by a check in this case, earned
and to be paid in addition to the $1500.
No
Answer "yes" or

"No'~

If you have answered the foregoing question
"Yes" then answer the following:
(2)

In which of the three period referred to
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in Group No. 1 was the $1000. represented by said check, earned~

(Insert one of the three periods
listed in Group 1, by citing
the dates.)
/s/

LaMar E·. Peterson

F'O·REMAN
(R. 22)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
All of the points stated by Respondent and CrossAppellant in its Cross-Ap,peal are covered by or involved
in the points of argument as stated by the Appellant at
pages 31 and 32. It app·ears that the six points in the
Statement of Points on Cross-Appeal (R. 51-52) are thus
covered: App·ellant's point 2 covers our points 1, 3, 4,
and 5; Appellant's point 3 covers our points 2 and 5;
and Appellant's point 4 covers our point 6.
The purpose of the Cross-Appeal is to correct the
error of the district. court in entering judgment for
$1,500.00 after the jury had found in its special verdict
that the value of the unpaid services prior to November
1, 1947, was $1,100.00, the value of Plaintiff's services
from October 31, 1947, to March 24, 1948, was $300.00,
and the value of services after March 24, 1948, was
$100.00 (R. 19) and also found that it was the intention
of the parties that the individual items of the account
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for services rendered by the Appellant should be considered independently and that Defendant owned Plaintiff for each ite1n of service as it was complete (R. 20)
and also found that there was an agreement to pay upon
the happening of a contingency and that the contingency
occured on September 11, 1947 (R. 21).
We shall, therefore, discuss Appellant's points in
the order stated by Appellant and show how the correct
decision of these points requires entry of a judgn1ent
for $100.00 on the special verdict.
ARGUMENT
APPELLANT'S POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE BURDEN WAS ON THE
DEFENDANT TO SHO\V BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT THAT HAD BEEN PAID TO
THE PLAINTIFF FOR HIS SERVICES AS REQUESTED
IN PARAGRAPH TWO OF HIS REQUESTS (R. 23-24).

The Appellant's request No. 2 (R. 23) 'vas correctly
refused as being a meaningless request. It was n1eaningless because although it referred to the preponderan<'r
of the evidence, there was no request for an instrn('tion
to indicate where the burden of proof lay in determining
the amount paid for legal services.
The instruction as to burden of proof on the special
verdict was No. 2A of the instructions :
"The plaintiff has the burden of proving the
amounts that you fill in for each lin0 of n roup 1.
If a preponderance of the evidenre flop~ not show
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any amount for a particular line, write in 'none',"
(R. 25).
It will he noted that the questions known as Group
1 were rewritten in conference in the court's chambers,
and that although the defendant had requested several
interrogatories as to the items finally making up Group
1 the court suggested that a single question could cover
the entire series of transactions. To this the plaintiff
made no objection, and the defendant made no formal
objection and in effect both parties acquiesced in the
court's approach to this proble1n, and it was considered
to be generally the amount owing as to which the plaintiff
had the burden of proof.
Exceptions of the plaintiff to the instructions of
the jury were taken after the jury had retired by agreeInent of the parties.
A transcript of these proceedings
shows the following: .
"THE COlTRT: Let the record show the
Jury has retired and counsel may take their
exceptions.
"JUDGE HANSON: Comes now the plaintiff and directs and excepts to the giving of the
Instruction No. 29, (should be 2A) and to the
whole thereof, 2-b and the whole thereof, and to
the submitting to the jury of Instructions-strike
that, Proposed Finding No. 2, 'for the reason and
upon the ground that in this case ·the evidence
shows as a matter of law, that the claim here sued
upon is not barred by the Statute of Limitations,
because of the following reasons:'" (R. 49'2).

In this state1nent there was no reference to the matter
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of burden of proof or preponderance of the evidence,
and there is none in the balance of the exceptions.
No objection was made or exception taken to the
failure to give Appellant's request No. 2, and the request
itself does not suggest that defendant had this burden.
The rnatter of burden of proof on the 1na tter of paYJ.nent
just was not brought to the court's attention.
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"No party n1ay assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an instruction unless he objeet~
thereto."
This· clause under the federal decisions interpreting the
comparable Federal rule would preclude plaintiff fron1
arguing erroneous instructions on this point. However~
the Utah Rule adds a clause not found in the Federal
rule which is:
"Notwithstanding the foregoing require1nent
the appellate court in its discretion and in the
interests of justice, may revie'v the giving or
failure to give an instruction."
. The Respondent's position is that since the instructions here were formulated in the court's chambers with
the acquiescence of both parties neither party should be
allowed to claim as error the giving of instructions as
framed since no objection thereto was made and the
court had no opportunity to modify the instrurtions to
meet sueh objections.
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Befor~

the pro1nulgation of the Rules of Civil Procedure there 'vas authority that without any requests
for instructions a party can challenge on appeal the
giving of erroneous instructions. This rule is stated in
Sutton vs. Otis Eleva.tor Co., 68 Utah 85, 249 P. 437, and
is based on subdivision (--!) of 104-24-14, U. C. A. 1943,
\vhich provides in part:
""vVhen the evidence is concluded the court
shall instruct the jury in writing upon the law
applicable to the case * *."
The court held that this rule requires correct instruction&.
on any question covered regardless of requests. But this
provision was omitted from Rule 51 and has not been the
la'v of l 1 tah since January 1, 1950.
Furthermore, a further analysis of the facts involved
casts some duobt on the correctness of the proposition
that ~he defendant had the burden of proving payment,
and makes the likelihood of error by the jury extremely
remote, if not impossible.
The rule as to burden of proof upon which Appellant relies is limited to the situation where full payment
is claimed by the debtor so that the entire cause of action
of the creditor is defeated. In our case Respondent
claims that several partial payments were made, that
several items were paid in full, and that there was a paylnent in full up to May, 1937, when stock was transferred.
As to a debt 20 years old or more, there is a presumption
of paYJnent without any evidence, and the creditor has
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the burden of proof of non-payment as to such an
account. 40 Am. Jur. 876 and 881. And part of the
account here was of such age.
Furthermore, the Appellant admitted that he
received $600 for patenting claims, received all the payments which he requested for the handling of the Golden
West ouster suit, including payment pursuant to a statenlent \Vhich \vas entitled "for services in full on Golden
West Suit" (Exhibit 3). Beck admitted that he received
the stock in 1937 and that he paid nothing for it, and that
it \Vas rec~ived on account and not as a gift (R. 288),
and adn1itted generally that the records of l\Ir. llolden
showing payments to the plaintiff were accurate, and
that the plaintiff had no records (R.. 273-37{). 1'his
1neans that there was no issue as to payments n1ade and
no issue as to the value of payments unless there was an·
issue as to the value of stock given in 1937.
As to the stock, Beck contends it was a part paylnent, and the defendant contends it was payment in full
to date. There is a presumption that such a tranBfer
was a paJlnent on account and not a gift (In re Will;not,
211 Iowa 34, 230 N. E. 330, 71 A. L. R. 1018) and any
payment made is presumed to be a payment in full unless
the contrary appears (70 C.J.S. 314). Mr. Beck takes
the position that the stock was received as a pay1nent
on account although intended as a payment in full to
date, and the burden of proving the particular application of that payment is on the person who n1ade the
application (70 C.J.S. 303).
But beyond all this, there is no dispute in thiH casr
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:.as to the. receipt of payments. Since B·eck acknowledgetl

.receipt of the stock in 1937, there is: no issue on it as to
.receipt, and the jury· was free to, find,. and possibly did
find that th~ stock .was received ·on, account..The ;jury';s
only probl-em \Yas to place a value on, the ..stock:~and. there
-,vas no burden of, proof as to value. :Furtherm·or·e,,there
·\vas no evidence. as~ to Yalue except~ the ·evidence of ··Mr.
B-eck that the stock,was worth 1 ·cent.a share (R. 290),
. and pres tunably the jury placed that .value on i it if it
found that it 'vas a part payment only.
It UlUSt. also be borne in mind that if Re-spo:ro.tlent
·is correct on the law of th~ Statute of Limitations· as
applied in this, ease, then. ·all of. the .Appellant's causes
·of action prior to .11arch .2o, :1948, ·are· barred· and.:since
:all pa-yments made by!the Respondent-were made prior
to that date the inquiry into the matter vf payment: and
-:the burden of proof thereon· would be academic.
It thus app~ears th-at the Respondent did not·; have
the burden of. proof. as to any contest-eo m'atters of pay·n1ent. ·Beck ·had the burden of proVing ·that any·pay1ments made and ·acknowledged by him ·were partial
payments 'as against the contention of the_ defendant
that certain payments , \vere payments ·in full for par:ticular· ite1ns or pay1nents to date. See 70 C. J. S:3.39:·antl
Wealtley v. }Jfizell, 193 Ill. App. '494. Since there .was no
·issue on any other iten1s, ·it -vvas p-roper for the court to
:giv·e instruction that the burden of proof was on the
Appellant to show the· amount owing, ·after giving credit
·to the Respondent for ·payn1ents which 'the Respondent
:had made and.which the Appellant-acknowledged receiv-
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ing. The Appellant had the burden of proving that the
payment of $600 for patenting in 1924, of the 20,000
shares of stock in 1937 and for the Golden West suit
in 19·44 in full did not amount to payment in full for
those items and up to 1937. There was no error in the
instruction given and certainly no error as a practical
1na.tter or in a.ny way "\vhich could be considered to have
prejudiced the jury or amount to error in the proceedings .
. A_ppellant argues that the pres-umption of payment
disappears "where there is evidence touching a fact in
controversy" (Page 35) and cites State v. Green, 78 Utah
58, 6 Pac. 2nd 177, and In re Newell's E sta,te, 78 Utah 463.
Appellant either 1nisconceives or mis-states the rule.
The presumption does not disappear until there is evidence contrary to the presumption propertly received
and such is the holding of the two Utah cases. In one,
the presumption of sanity was rebutted by evidence of
insanity and in the other the presumption of unintentional omission fron1 a will was rebutted by evidence
that the omission was intentional. In the case at bar,
the only evidence as to payment was evidence that payments were 1nade. Both parties testified to the payn1ent
of money for the by-laws and minutes (R. 275 and 381),
and patenting work (R. 275 and 388); Holden testified
that the stock was in payment of all services up to 1937
(R. 390-396), and Beck admitted receipt of the stock and
that it was payment on account (R. 288, 289), and both
testified to· payments of $100, $225, and $375 in paytnent
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of services in the Golden West E.jectment suit (R. 280,
273, 397) and Beck admitted a long list of other payments (Exhibit 12, Answer to Interrogatory No. 6), and
stated that the most reliable evidence was to be found
in Mr. Holden's books (R. 273). Beck made no demand
for pay1nent and rendered no statement for services
rendered which "\Yas not paid imn1ediately until the final
demand of September 20, 1949 (R. 256).
Appellant's statement "that it is prejudicial error
to place the burden of proof on the wrong party" has
no application to this case.
The statement is entirely too broad and the authorities cited by Appellant, if followed, would require the
Court to hold in the case at bar that no prejudicial error
was comn1itted. Appellant cites the following four case·s:
Hillyard vs. Ba.ir, 47 Utah 561, 155 Pac. 449, where
the Court held it was prejudicial error to give instructions on a question not in issue. There \vas no decision
on whether the instruction of burden of proof was
prejudicial error, the ··Court saying that this question
"was not excepted to nor is it assigned as error; hence,
it is not before us for review."
Whipple vs. Preece, et al, 18 Utah 454. That case
involved conversion of property in which the Defendant
set up an affirmative defense and made a written request
for instructions to the jury on the burden of proof.. The
court refused the request and gave no instructions on
burden of proof as to the affirmative matter. Under
these circumstances the Court held very properly that
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:.the jury ·might have been misled saying: "lTnder the
pleadings, the Court ought .to have instructed the jury
of .its own,motion .that,.as to the.affirmative matter set
up in the answer, the burden of proof was .upon the
defense, and.having .failed to do this, .that .Plaintiff was
entitled to have his reque-st given to the jury, ·without
any words of refusal on it." But the Appellant has not
brought himself within this case since there is no real
issue on. the matter of pf:tyn1ent, there \vas no written
request. on the burden of proof, there ,was no. exception
taken to the refusal of the Court to instruct, and S-ection
104-24-14 (4) U:· C. A. 1943, under which this Court has
.held that .correct :instructions 1nust be . given without
request from the parties, has been r~pealed and there
is no longer any such requirement.
Dimnick v. Uta.h Fuel Cornpany, :49 Utah '430, 164
.Pac. 872. This case is dead against the Appellant. It
.holds that the instruction on burden of proof was not
so erroneous as to have· misled the jury. and the judg,ment ·.was affirmed, the Court . stating: "Appellant's
counsel in their brief, contend that the instruction waB
erroneous and prejudicial in other particulars, but "re
!find no. exceptions were taken in th·e Court below to such
other portions of the in-structions now complained of, and
therefore this Court cannot here. for the first. tin1e consider them as grounds for reversal."
In Re HO!Y/Json's Will, 50 Utah 206, :167 Pac. 256. In
this :case an. instruction on. undue influence in making a
will was given to·the ·jury, and the Supreme Court found
that there .was no evidence to support it. The Court
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found also that it was error not to make a charge on the
burden of proof as to undue influence, even though no
request was made. The Court indicated that this case
was exceptional in that the failure to charge on burden
of proof "'"a~ prejudicial error, whereas ordinarily, it
'vould not be, thus discussing the point: "While we do
not desire to be understood as holding that it would be
error under all circumstances to omit to charge upon the
question of budren of proof, yet, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the
C.ourt erred in failing to instruct the jury upon the
question of burden of proof on the issue of undue influence ***."
APPELLANT'S POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE
JURY THE PROPOSITION CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTION
2 FOR THE REASON THAT AS A MATTER O·F LAW THE
CLAIM SUED UPON IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS (R. 25 and Tr. 492).

Appellant's argun1ent on this point is under four
headings: First, no cause of action arose until Appellant made demand for payment; Second, Personal service of smn1nons was not obtainable for a sufficient time
to bar the action; Third, Respondent acknowledged
existence of the obligation within four years; F:ourth,
the 1naintenance of the company office kept the action
alive.

'Ve shall first answer these four facets of Appellant's argument and then state why Respondent believes
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that the Statute of Limitations was a real issue and
properly submitted to the jury.
First, Appellant made no demand. The authorities
cited by Appellant at pages 39 and 40 of his brief are
inapplicable. The case cited by Appellant, Wilson vs.
lVeber County, 100 Utah 141, 11 Pac. 2d 147, holds that
no demand was necessary to start the running of the
Statute of Limitations for an action to recover a filing
fee under a void statute. The quotation from the case
simply indicates that it is possible to have a situation
where a demand is a condition precedent. Appellant
points to nothing in this case by agree1nent of the parties
or implied from their conduct \vhich make a demand a
condition precedent.
And in any event, the making of a demand by the
Appellant was obviated when the Respondent asked for
a statement. This was made in the summer of 1946, and
the jury found that such request was made by the
Respondent at a time when the Respondent was able to
pay, namely, September 11, 1947 (R. 21).
Second, personal service was not obtainable on thP
Respondent corporation for the preceding four year
period. It is conceded by the Appellant that the Respondcorporation was not absent from the State. ln the trial
Court, Appellant was inconsistent. He argued that the
Respondent was absent from the state within the meaning of 104-2-36, U. C. A. 1943, (now 78-12-35, tT. C. A.
1953) and then argued that there was no basis for attachment because the Respondent was not absent from the
state.
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Appellant is a little tnore cautious in his brief before
this court but still cannot avoid the inconsistency. Appellant argues that there was no basis for attachment,
because Respondent \vas not concealing itself, and avoids
meeting the argument of absence from the state hy ignoring that basis for attach1nent (App,ellant's brief, page
45). Appellant then argues that the corporation was in
law a resident of the State, and therefore, not absent
even though all of its officers weTe absent {Appellant's
brief, page 46) .
The corporation was either absent from the state
or present within the state in contemplation of law. If
absent, jurisdiction could have been obtained by an
attachment and Appellant therefore had a remedy and
a practical means of pressing his action. If the Respondent vvas not absent fron1 the state, then the provisions of
78-12-35, lT. C. .~..\. 1953, \Vere not applicable, the Statute
of Limitations was not tolled, and the Appellant's argument amount.s only to a statement of reasons why the
statute should be amended to provide for tolling of the
Statute of Li1nitations vvhen a Plaintiff has no practicable
remedy rather than li1nit it to absence from the state.
The two questions involved in this point are entirely
separable: We have argued that there was a practicable
remedy in an effort to shovv the reasonableness of the
Statute; regardless of the reasonableness of the Statute,
thr Appellant must come within its tenns to prevent the
running of the Statute.
Appellant points to U. C. A. 19'43, Section 102-5-
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11 (5) (Brief page 41). This statute directs that service
of summons may be made upon the Secretary of a
domestic corporation and if such cannot be found, then
upon a director. Beck was both the Secretary and a
director. He then argues that he could not serve himself
and therefore, this provision could not be followed. We
again suggest that Beck was in frequent touch with
Mr. Holden and could have had himself served and
advised Mr. Holden of it in an effort to compel an
appearance, or Mr. Beck could have commenced an attachment proceeding, or he could have asked Mr. Holden
whether he would make an appearance, or he could have
obtained service by publication.

Section 104-5-12, U. C. A. 1943, provides for service
of sun1mons by publication pursuant to order of court
"where the defendant is a corporation having no officer
or other agent upon which summons can be served within this state." It provides in Section 104-5-13 that copies
of the summons and co1nplaint must be mailed to the
defendant where the address is known. Since Mr. Bec.k
testified about nmnerous visits with Mr. I-Iolden in Lo~
Angeles, and since he was charged with 1nailing notire~
of 1neetings to the directors there can be no question
that Mr. Beck knew the addresses of Mr. Holden and
other officers.
The annotation at 126 A. I •. R. 1474 and especially
149·4 to 1497 makes plain the validity of this type of
service of process on a domestic corporation and that thP

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35

result is personal jurisdiction of the domestic corporation.
This 1natter is carried into the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure as Rule 4 (f) (1).
Furthermore, the absence of officers of a domestic
corporation does not make the corporation absent from
the state.

••A domestic corporation, created by the laws
of the state of the forum, must be treated as a
citizen of that state, and the absence of its officers is not necessarily such aJbsence of the corporation as will toll the statute of limitations." 55
C.J.S. 238.
Cited in support of this statement are Shermam vs.
Buffalo Bayou, B. & C. R. Co., 21 Tex. 349, upon which
the Appellant comn1ents at page 50 of his brief. We
believe the case supports our position and not the position of the Appellant. The other case cited in the suppleInental annotations is Heitnzelman vs. Union News Compa.rvy, 76 N. Y. S. 2nd 496.
The Appellant's reference to Sherman vs. Buffalo
Bayou mentions a corporation 'vhich maintains an office
as not being beyond the state. It should be born in mind
that under the facts of this case plaintiff contends that
the office of the corporation was in Mr. Beck's office at
all times until the cornmencement of action and he
sought compensation in this case for use of his office as
a service to the corporation. This being true the corporation at all times had an office and the argument that the
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corporation was abs:ent from the state because· it had
no officers or agents in the state would seem to fall of
necessity. The Appellant's position then is, not that the
corporation had no office in the state, but that the corpOration had no officer within the state except the plaintiff
who now contends he was not able
to' serve the corpora,.
tion by serving himself. This argument has no appli~tion to Section 104-2-36, U. C. A. 1943 which deals 'vith
aJbsence from the state, and if the argument has any
validity it would have to be under 104-2-37 U. c:; A. 1943,
which deals with disability of the plaintiff. This is
because there was an officer of the corporation in the
state at all times and service could have been made
under Section 104-5-11 a.t any ti1ne by anyone other than
the plaintiff. The plaintiff says that he could not serYe
himself, but this is not one of the disabilities which tolls
the statute of hnitations under the section on disablity.
No special rule is made for the plaintiff and nowhere is
there any rule under the statute of limitations which
says that where the defendant corporation is present
within the state and any person except the plaintiff
could file an action, the statute of limitations is tolled
as to the plaintiff.
Appellant states on page 49 that a corporation" ha~
no existence independent of its stockholders and officers"
without citing any authority to that end. The authorities
cited by us hold that a domestic corporation is present
in its state of creation at all times. Appellant's argument
that this results in a hardship to him should not be heard,
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because Appellant made absolutely no effort to commence an action against the Respondent corporation until
March 25, 1952.

Third, there 1oas an acknowledgement of the claim
sued on.

Exhibit 3A offered to pay the plaintiff $1,000 and
refers to an earlier request that the amount owing .he
fixed so that the defendant could pay it.
It must be born in mind that the account here was
not liquidated and th~ endeavor of the defendant was to
find out how much the plaintiff was claiming. If there
was no dispute as to the amount owing, and the defendant had offered $1,000, it would be easier to find the
letter which is Exhibit 3A to be an acknowledgment of
an existing debt and at the sa1ne time an offer to pay
a part of the amount owing in satisfaction of the larger
amount. No such intention is found in Exhibit 3A.
Defendant acknowledged that son1ething was owing to
the plaintiff and offered to pay $1,000 to satisfy the
entire claim, without any indication that there would be
or could be any additional amount owing by the defendant to the plaintiff. vV e think that was an offer by the
defendant to pay $1,000 for any clain1 the plaintiff might
have against the defendant and that there was no
acknowledgement beyond that. 34 Am. ~Jur. Sections 303,
304 and 306 state the law generally but a careful reading
of Exhibit 3A will have to control its interpretation.
Appellant states that the lTtah cases make a

distin~
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tion between an action or promise to pay after the
Statute has run and the cases where the Statute has not
run, and there is merely an acknowledgement (Brief
page 51).
34 Am. Jur., Limitations af actions, Section 293
states: "The general -rule seems to be that there is
no distinction between the legal effect of an action
or payment made before or after the bar of the
Statute of Limitations has attached, as in either
case the effect is to subvert the principles or presumed payment on which in many states that
Statute is deemed to be founded."
In Section 294, the treatise goes on to distinguish
between a promise made before and one made after the
·statute has run, insofar as the creation of a new cause
of action is concerned, indicating that it is generally
held that after the Statute has run and the action is
barred,
"The acknowledg1nent or promise is therefore
held to create a ne'v contract, giving the creditors
a new cause of action."
In support of this statement Attorney General vs. Pomeroy, 9·3 Utah 426, 73 Pac. 2nd 1277, 114 A. L. R. 726 i~
cited. This case indicates that there is no difference in
the formality or degree or definiteness of the acknowledgment in the two cases, but that there is a difffrenre
in the theory of pleading the Statute of Limitations. The
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case holds at page 755 of 114 A. L. R. that where the
acknowledgment is made before the statute has run, the
pleadings must be to that effect, and "if made after the
Statute has run so as to revive the debt as against the
statute, such aclmowledgment must be pleaded as a basis
of the action."
. Respondent adn1its that, under the special verdict,
the Statute had not run at the tin1e Exhibit 3A was sent,
but Respondent denies any such distinction as the unsupported statement of Appellant attempts to make. The
cases hold that an acknowledgment made prior to the
time the Statute has run will be carefully scrutinized and
there will be no implied acknowledgment of an entire
debt beyond the specific acknowledgment in the document.
It must be remembered that in 1946 and 1947 Mr.
Holden had den1anded a bill or statement from the Appellant and in the fall of 1947 the Appellant asked for
$2,000 on account which demand Mr. I-Iolden had refused,
until he had a statement of the account (R. 386).
Exhibit 3A is dated March 29, 1948, on the stationery
of Dutchman Coalition Mine Company and reads as
follows:
"Mr. Clarence M. Beck
416 Felt Bldg.
Salt Lake City
Utah
D·ear Clarence
It has been nearly two years since I have been
trying to get your bill for services on the Dutch-
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man Coalition Mines Co. this I have been unable
to do, your many promises to submit it have never
·been fulfilled.
The Directors here feel that we should declare
a small dividend but are reluctant to do so till all
bill's are paid.
We have gone over the work that you have
done and the money we have paid you together
with the Thirty Thousand shares of stock you
received and feel that the enclosed check for OKE
THOUSAND DOLLARS· is a very liberal one to
compensate the payment for your services to this
date.
We will take it for granted that the cashingof this check constitutes your acceptance as payment in full for all services rendered"
Sincerely
Harry W. Holden/s/
President
DUTCHMAN COALITION MINES CO."
It is plain that this letter was an effort to compromise and settle this claim at a price substantially less
than the $2,000 Mr. Beck had demanded and that it \Va~
not a general acknowledgment of an account in an
amount to be determined.
The accompanying check for $1,000 had a typed
endorsement: "Payment in full for all legal services to
date." And so was likewise an offer and attempt to get
this matter settled and paid for $1,000 and wa~ not an
acknowledgment of an entire account.
The authorities hold generally that sur.h a co1n-
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promise offer rnust be accepted to form a contract in
settlement of a clairn and will not, alone, toll the Statute
of Lin1itations and annotation at 12 A. L. R. 544 cites
nwnerous cases but none from Utah either for or against
this position.
Fourth, the rna.intenance of the company's office in
Clarence Beck's office was a continuous service and kep~t
the cause of action alive. Appellant makes this statement at page 36 of his brief but argues it only in his
main Point Three.
The answer to Interrogatory 3B in the special verdict is a complete answer to this. This answer was that
the individual ite1ns of the account became due as the
services were perfor1ned and there is nothing about the
use of an office which suggests that no action can be
brought for such use until many years have elapsed.
Appellant argues this matter under his Point Three, and
'\Ve shall do likewise since on the face of it, the use of the
office is an easier item to bar under the Statute of Limitations than legal services generally, some of which may
not he complete for 3 or 4 years after their commencement.
A'PPELLANT'S POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS TO ANSWER ITEM b OF GROUP 3 IN
THAT THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHO·WS THAT
THERE WAS A RUNNING ACCOUNT AND EACH ITEM
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED INDEPENDENTLY (R. 20 and
Tr. 493).

Although Appellant refers in the statement of this
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point to "a running account" the Statute describes it as
"an open account."
The question is whether the account of the Appellant
here is "an open account for work, labor, or services
rendered," as contemplated by the Statute. This seems
to be answered by Bishop
Parker, 103 Utah 145, 134
Pac. 2d 180, where this court was construing this same
statute as applicable to a claim for services by an attorney against a corporation and rendered over a period of
some nine and one-half years. The court quoted from a
decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in Spencer v.
Sowers, 118 Kan. 259, 234 Pac. 972 at page 973, 39 A. L.
R. 365, the following definition:

v.

"A mutual open, current account may be
defined as an account usually and properly kept
in writing wherein are set down by express or
implied agreement of the parties concerned a connected series of debit and credit entries of reciprocal charges and allowances, and where the parties
intend that the· individual items of the accow1t
shall not be considered independently, but as a
continuation of related series, and that the account
shall ~be kept open and subject to a shifting balance as additional related entries of debits or
credits are made thereto, until it shall suit the
convenience of either party to settle and close the
account, and where pursuant to the original.
express, or implied intention there is but one
single and indivisible liability arising fro In such
series of related and reciprocal debits and credits,
which liability is to be fixed on the one part or
the other as the balance shall indicate at the ti1ue
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of settlement or following the last pertinent entry
of the account."
There just was no account kept between these
parties. There was no "\vay for the Respondent to know
what charges Mr. Beck intended to make, except as statements were rendered. All statements were paid promptly
and there was no underlying, continuing balance which
was known to Respondent.
It is of the essence of an open account that each
party knows or can detennine at anytime what balance
is owing and to whom it is owed.
Interjection of the matter of the office rental does
not alter the result. If Mr. Beck had ever indicated that
he was charging for his office and that the charge was to
be $1 per month or $2 per month, the Respondent could
have computed the elapsed time and made the payment.
There was never any assertion of a claim for use of
office, not even with the filing of this action, until at the
time of the pre-trial, the Appellant amended and included
the phrase "'and other" so to make the action one for
"legal an dother services" ( R. 10).
In re Steur's estate, 77 Cal. App. 584, 247 Pac. 211,
an action for board and room, and in re Porter's -estate,
110 Pa Super 27, 167 at 490, a claim for office services
are a complete answer to the contention of Appellant.
In the face of the case of Bishop vs. Parker (supra),
it is doubtful 'vhether Appellant here made a case to go
to the jury. The answer of the jury in the special verdict
that this was not a continuous account, but one calling
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for payment of each item as co1npleted, fully answers
the contention of Appellant.
APPELLANT'S POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUESTING THE
JURY TO ANSWER QUESTION 2 OF GROUP 5 IN THAT
IF MR. HOLDEN WAS PAID WHAT HE CLAIMED WAS
OWING TO HIM THERE WOULD BE NO MONEY TO PAY
PLAINTIFF (Tr. 493 and R. 21).

·Group 5 was directed to the happening of a contingency or a particular event which made Plaintiff's
apparent claim for services payable. Under Question 2,
of Group 5 the jury found that this event occured September 11, 1947. This was the date on which Mr. Holden
wrote a letter, following up his previous efforts to get a
statement out of the Appellant, in "\Vhich he stated that
the bill must be presented and the claim paid that year
(Exhibit 6, R. 300).
Any argun1ent as to what claims had priority and
whether there was enough money to pay Mr. Beck is
superfluous in the face of the demand and this finding.
On December 31, 1947, the Respondent had a cash balance
of $13,688.49 (Exhibit 15), and presumably had that much
on· September 11, 1947. This was more than enough to
pay the claim of Mr. Beck stated to be the amount of
$5,500.00 (Exhibit 3B and R. 219), and alleged with the
usual margin for shrinkage during the trial at $10~000.00
in the complaint (R. 1).
But even if Appellant be indulged in his argument
that it was not enough to pay Mr. Holden all he wanted
and to pay Mr. Beck all he might claim, it was sperifically
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stated by Mr. Holden that he "\vould not have drawn one
penny of compensation until outstanding bills had been
paid, and that if ~Ir. Beck had presented a bill that bill
would have been paid before any salary was taken by
himself (R. 400).
APPELL.ANT'S POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL (R. 45 and 48).

This point was stated in the ~lotion for New Trial
as point 4 (R. 45). ~fuch to the surprise of Respondent,
there appeared in the record at pages 53 and 54, a memorandum signed by the trial judge ~'written at the request
of counsel for the Plaintiff because the request made iby
the Court referred to herein had not been preserved."
There was no notice given to Respondent of any conference between the Plaintiff or his counsel and the Court
on this matter and no notice that any such memorandum
was to be included in the record. Respondent regards
it as highly improper and as a document which should
be stricken from the files. Respondent herewith and
hereby moves that pages 53 and 54 of the record and
also that all of point 5 of Appellant's argument be striken
from the record.
Realizing the latitude that both the district court
and the Supreme Court have under the Rules of Civil
Procedure and the spirit of those rules to permit a wide
dis·cretion to both Courts, Respondent will proceed to
argue Appellant's point Five without waiving the motion.
Appellant argues at great lengths that the request
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from the trial judge came too late. Respondent's view
is that if Appellant were interested in that question, it
should have- been argued in the trial court as suggested
by the trial judge so as to give Respondent also an
opportunity to reply and to satisfy the trial judge.
Respondent admits that it would have objected to the
timeliness of the argument, but was prepared to argue
the point raised by the trial judge. The point does not
appear difficult and having heard the parties, the Court
would undoubtedly have adhered to its ruling denying
the 1Yiotion for New Trial.
Appellant has now placed himself in the position of
raising a question before this Court for the first time
and the Court should not hear it. The matter is material
to the motion for new trial and should have been raised
in the argument.
The cases cited by Judge Jeppson are not applicable
to the facts of this case, and if they were, the ans"Trr
would be readily found in the cases cited by tludge Jeppson. And if there was any doubt at the time the Ineinorandum was written and inserted gratutiously in this
file, the uncertaini ty has been resolved by the recent
case of Ladder vs. Western Pacific R. ro., Case No.
7809.
The difference in the two types of cases lies in the
fact that where verdicts are excessive there has been a
satisfaction of the right to trial 'by jury by getting jury
approval for a large amount. The Plaintiff is given a
clear choice of reduction of the verdict or a ne'v trial.
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In our case, there has been no good reason to believe
that any jury would clear any additional amount. A new
trial under these circmnstances thus becomes an invitation to a jury to go beyond an amount already found
by a jury and gives nobody a right to accept a lesser or
greater an1ount or go through the expense and worry of
a new trial. The requisite degree of passion and prejudice to require a new trial are lacking, and there is no
possible middle course of ''remit or suffer a new trial"
consonant with passion and prejudice simply hinted at
in the verdict. Appellant also notes this difference,
(Brief, page 65-66).
Let us inquire into the cases mentioned by Judge
Jeppson and then consider whether the facts of this
case suggest any prejudice whatsoever of the jury.
The first of these cases was Pauly vs. 111cC a,rthy
(Utah 1947) 18-1- Pac. :2nd 123, at 126-127. In that case
this Court "\Vas stating \·vhat it regarded as well established principles of la"\v under the rules for granting new
trials and observed that "mere excessiveness of a verdict
\Vithout rnore does not, necessarily, show that the verdict
was arrived at hy passion or prejudice" and noted that
the Supre1ne Court could set aside the verdict and order
a new trial where the verdict "\Vas "so excessive as to
appear to have been given under the influence of passion
or prejudice, and the trial court abused its discretion
or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the motion
for n~'v trial." The Court observed further that a new
trial n1ust he granted where the facts show that as a
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matter of law the verdict was excessive or where it is
"so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience.'' The
Court held that the verdict in the Pauly case did not
meet the latter test and that it was, therefore, proper for
the court to order a new trial unless a substantial remission in the verdict was made.
In Duffy vs. Union Pac. R. Co. (Utah 19·50) 218
Pac. 2nd 1080, the trial Court had denied the motion for
new trial and had not ordered a ren1ission of any portion
of the verdict of $12,500 as reduced by the contributory
negligence factor of $3,500. The Supreme Court held
that it was within its power to direct a remittitur of
$4,000 and to order a nevv trial if the Plaintiff did not
accept the reduction. The Court affirmed the rule from
the earlier cases that the grossly excessive verdict can,
without other evidence, show passion and prejudice and
require a remission of part of the verdict. There waR
no discussion in this case of the difference between passion and prejudice which requires a remission of the
verdict and the passion and prejudice which requires a
complete new trial.
All of the cases were revie\ved in Wheat rs. Dcnrer &
R. G. W. R. Co. (Utah 1952) 250 Pac. 2nd 932. There the
trial court had ordered a reduction of the verdict fron1
$17,000 to $10,000 or else that the Defendant have a
new trial and the Court concluded that this \Vas proper
because "the verdict was not so suffused \Vi th passion and
prejudice that the Defendant did not have a fair trial
on the other issues." At page 935 the Court stated thr
true rule to be
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Hthat if the verdict is so excessive as to show that
it must have been motivated by prejudice or ill
will toward a litigant, or that passion such as
anger, resentment, indignation, or some kindred
emotion has so overcome or distorted the jury's
reason that the verdict is vindictive, vengeful, or
punitive, it should be unconditionally set aside."
The cases '\Vere again reviewed by this Court in
Lodder vs. Western Pacific R. Co., Case No. 7809,
decided in July, 1953. The Court tabulated juries' verdicts and the remissions approved by the Court giving
the percentages of net verdicts constituting remissions
and held that the verdicts did not require a new trial
but that it was propertly denied conditioned upon a
remission of part of the verdict. The Court said:
'~But

we find no case where this Court has
held that as a matter of law passion and prejudice
were shown n1erely by the excessive an1otmt of
the verdict so we have not indicated how great an
a1nount or percentage of reduction would be
required to n1ake such a showing but we have
approved reductions as high as 50 percent, and
required a reduction of 70 percent of punitive
damages or about 63 percent of the total verdict
where there was no other evidence of passion and
prejudice. The trial judge evidently concluded
that the verdict 'vas not so tainted."
Judge Jeppson did not correctly appraise these
cases. He assun1es that new trials had been conditionally
granted "without evidence of passion" and believe.d also
that in the Wheat case a reduction was allowed without

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

50
the "existence of passion." He speculates that if a verdict could be reduced or a new trial granted without the
existence of passion then perhaps a new trial could be
granted on the same sho,ving without any re1nission.
The decisions of this Court plainly state that passion
and prejudice must be found to have existed in all of the
cases where verdicts were remitted under penalty of a
new trial. The thing the ,Judge missed was that the
Supreme Court has plainly recognized differences in
degree of passion and prejudice and that a ne\r trial is
compelled only when the entire verdict is tainted with
passion, prejudice, or hostility.
Judge Jeppson plainly held in his me1norandun1 that
there was no evidence of passion or prejudice showing
hostility or sufficient to taint the whole verdict; indeed,
he indicates that there was no evidence of passion. HiR
language was that "no evidence was pre sen ted of passion
or prejudice, except as might be inferred fron1 the s1nall
amount of the verdict" and then immediately he referred
to the situation as one "without evidence of pa~sion.H
Again we say, that an argument of this point beforr
Judge Jeppson would probably have satisfied hitn that
this was no place for a new trial. At the most, there was
here such evidence of prejudice as to eall, in the railroad
cases for conditional denial of a new trial, conditioned
upon remitting part of the verdict. And where th<) Yerrlirt
is deemed to be inadequate, this would require the denial
of the new trial, for lack of intPnse

pa~sion

or prPjudir(l,
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increase in the verdict because of denial of trial by jury..
But the Respondent does not concede that there is
any evidence whatsoever of passion or prejudice even in
a slight degree. It is quite reasonable that a lawyer on
the bench would be Inore sympathetic with a large fee
for a la,vyer, than '''"ould a non-lawyer jury. All lawyers
must realize that 'vhen they go to court to collect their
fees, they must subject themselves to the test of reasonableness before a non-lawyer jury. If Mr. Beck is willing
to be dilatory in preparing his statement for his legal
services, he must realize that the ultimate statement can
be subjected to the scrutiny of a jury. Respondent asked
for a jury trial, believing that it would be disadvantageous to the Plaintiff as against determination of fees by
a Judge. Perhaps Respondent's counsel is subject to
criticism for subjecting a fello'v attorney's staten1ent for
services to a jury. But before this Court could fairly
indulge in any conjecture on that subject it would have
to know the details of the offers and counter-proposals
made by the parties in efforts to settle this matter before .
suit was filed.
Furtherinore, is it not a lawyer's duty to his client
to ask for a jury trial when the subject matter of the
case is such that a non-lawyer jury would probably hold
the verdict down as against the judg1nent of this Court~
And regardless of the views of counsel in the matter,
the Respondent itself elected to have a jury trial, insisted
that the jury trial be not waived, and speculations as to
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relations between attorneys are entirely beside the point.
This verdict must be tested upon evidence presented
and Respondent contends that the amount of the verdict
was not inadequate but was fair and even generous under
the circumstances.
Mr. Beck asked for $5,500 in September, 1949
(Exhibit 3B, R. 219), sued for $10,000 (R. 1) and had
two lawyers testify as experts that the services rendered
were worth $12,000 or more (R. 232 & 246) but these
experts heard only Beck's direct testimony-they heard
no cross examination or other testimony tending to prove
that Beck had been paid in full for many parts of his
services, .had received payments on account, had been
paid in full up to a certain date in 1937, had never rendered some of the services he testified to, and had been
so chummy with Mr. Gottron, whom he claimed to haYfl
dissuaded from bringing an action, that the jury 'vas
fully justified in allowing only $100 for this latter iten1
.and should have allowed nothing.
Let us start with $12,000 as the reasonable value
of all services rendered, as testified by Ben L. Rich.
Then let us substract from that the a1nounts whirh the
jury might reasonabl~ conclude had been paid for, werr
not rendered, or were not compensable.
Mr. Rich placed values on the following portions of
Mr. Beck's services :
Golden West
ejectment suit ................$1,000 to $1,500 (R.. 240)
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By-la,vs, minutes,
incorporation ------------------

500 to

750 (R. 240)

Patenting four rlaims ________ 5,000 to

6,000 (R. 242)

Dissuading Gottron
from suing· ---------------------- 2,000

(R. 233)

Total minimum charges ..$8,500
That would leave $3,500 for all other general services
for the period of 1921 through 1947, as the general services pretty well ceased in 1947. There was strong evidence of payment in full to a date of 1937 (Exhibit B,
pages 38 and 42, R. 396). That would be for 16% years
and leave 10lj2 to the end of 1947. Applying this to
$3,500, the unpaid balance for 10:y2 years was $94.60 per
year or $993.30. The jury's finding of $1,100 for this
item was therefore well within the evidence. And this
deducts nothing for additional small payments made to
Beck (Exhibit 12, Ans'\ver to Interrogatory 5 ). Neither
does it deduct anything for numerous references in
Beck's testimony to negotiations, trips to the mine, and
meetings with Cleghorn and Bourne (R. 131, 147, 149,
151-153, 161, 162, 170, 181, 183, 185, 186, 193, 197, 305)
which Cleghorn and Bourne denied almost completely
(R. 345,351,360,363,366,372).
No other witness, including Beck, gave the jury any
hasis for deter1nining the relative values of the services
for \vhich Beck had apparently been paid in full but for
which he was still seeking payment.
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The jury could have taken Beck's own statement for
services and reduced that. Beck asked for $5,500 (Exhibit
3B) and told Gottron that that was his bill ( R. 463, 475476). Included in this were services in preparing originnl
by-laws and minutes (R. 64, 66, 70, 73), for which he
had been paid (R. 274-275, 380); services in patenting
claims (R. 276 & 277) for which he was paid in full
(R. 388); services in Golden West ejectment suit (R.
~83) for which he had been paid in full by Beck's own
acknowledgment (Exhibit 3); services in dealing with
Gottron when actually Gottron and Beck had their heads
together to combine forces against Respondent (Exhib~t
20, R. 472-479); services to Combined Metals (R. 223,
321), Willard Cleghorn (R. 326-327), Dutchman lessees
(R. 329-330) where a conflict of loyalties was involved
and where Beck had never indicated that he was planning to hold the Respondent (R. 324, 326-327, 329-330,

335). And again the jury should have found payn1ent
in full to the 1niddle of 1937, applied ratably to the general services. Since Beck deigned not to break down
his claim for services (R. 326, Exhibit 12, Answers to
interrogatories 6 and 7 there is no workable basis in
Beck's charges and the jury si1nply had to use its be-st
judgment.
Also, Mr. Rich testified that the prices charged hy
Beck on separate iterns were referable to the halan<'t· of
his services (R. 24·2-243) and the inexpertness of his
services were reflected by Cleghorn ( R. 348-349) nnd
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his lack of forthrightness in the Gottron correspondence
(R. 272-479).
On the eYidence 1n this case the jury could not
reasonably have done n1uch differently as to amount
unless it had blindly accepted Mr. Beck's testimony and
closed its eyes to eYer~~thing else in the case, including
the cross-examination of l\Ir. Beck.
SlT~I~IARY

_._\ND CONCLUSIONS

The Appellant had a full and fair trial and obtained
a proper verdict. The jury evidently applied to the
testimony the only practica;ble method it had of crediting
payments-the testimony of Mr. Rich on values of various parts of the services.
The difficult question in the case was the statute of
Lin1itations, \vhich was adn1irably handled by the special
verdict. The jury's answers resolve the issues and provide basis for a judgn1ent of either $100 (under the crossappeal) or $1,500 as entered by the court, depending on
two questions of la,v. The jury found, and is supported
by ample evidence, that the parties intended payment for
each ite1n of service as a separate item, but that payment
would not be due until a certain contingency which was
ability to pay. This contingency arose on September 11,
19-1-7 in Respondent's unequivocal written demand for
a staten1ent so the bill could be paid. That means the
statute of li1nitations con11nenced to run on September 11,
1947. All prior service~~ and all services to March 24,
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1948, were presumptively barred when the action was
commenced March 25, 1952, except for the $100 earned
after commencement of the action.
Barred, that is, unless Appellant proved either an
acknowledgment in the letter of March 29, 1948 (Exhibit
3A) or that absence of all officers of the Respondent
except the Appellant tolled the running of the statute.
Exhibit 3A was an offer to compromise and, since
unaccepted, did not revive or extend the statute. If this
revived $1,000 of the obligation, then the verdict should
be either $1,100 or $1,500 depending on the effect of
absence of some officers of the corporation.
Respondent's position is that absence of all officers
of a resident corporation would not toll the statute and
a fortiori presence in the state of Mr. Beck, the Secretary and a Director, made section 78-12-35 U. C. A.

195:~

inapplicable. The Appellant claims he had no remedy.
But Mr. Holden was anxious to get the matter settled
and would have entered an appearance as he actually did
without any service of summons, by answer filed within
14 days and no preliminary pleadings (R. 3). Proceeding by attachment (if the "absence" argument be sound)
would have :been effective. And the statute plainly pro.
vides for service by publication on a corporation with
no officers or agents in the State. The plain truth is
the Appellant didn't think about either servieP of sunlmons or the statute of limitations.
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The motion for new trial should be denied~ The
district court should be directed to reduce the judgment
as this court resolves the questions of law.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS AND BIRD AND
DAN S. BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Re:spondent
and Cross Appellant.
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